________________________________________________________________________________ Goran Gocic The Case of Media Wars in Former Yugoslavia Media increasingly are participants in war, but not necessarily combatants 0. Introduction In this essay I will make an attempt to show how media actively participate in wars. I will argue on example of wars in Yugoslavia that in contemporary wars media have a frequently decisive role. My approach to the topic is empirical, based on analysis of current US and UK media coverage of this subject. However, it makes a decent case study for the "propaganda model" theory of media in US, by Edward S Herman and Noam Chomsky1, who argued that there are several filters in the way of "objective" reporting, which cause considerable distorting of facts. The filters are: 1) size, ownership and profit orientation of the mass media 2) the advertising licence to do business 3) sourcing the mass media news 4) flak and the enforcers (negative reaction of the public to some media story) 5) anti-communism as a control mechanism 6) dichotomization and the propaganda campaigns. In Yugoslavia media wars, it seems that the last two filters are particularly important. It is media wars that are waged today. One can easily claim, for example, that in the purely military sense, the Gulf War did not take place at all - as Jean Baudrillard and Jeffrey Walsh did2. Or, to translate this radical form of Newspeech, it really did not matter what happened on ground, or whether anything happened at all, but what and how was reported. Obviously, there is a certain tension between media and military, which are engaged in the same war. The shocking events on the ground - such as "live" invasions or carnage of civilians - are scoops for the media, but potentially dangerous for the military. Theoretically, the media have interests in quickly showing what is happening on the ground and the military have interests to conceal it or manipulate the facts for their own propaganda purposes. The military is hiding their operations and builds new, invisible weapons, such as "Stealth" planes, resistive to radar. The media, on the other hand, are increasingly demanding revealing information and, if at all possible, picture. Both are aware that providing certain pictures, with deliberate propaganda intent or otherwise, can change the course of wars - it can justify them or prevent their further development. The military is aware of that: its game with the media is one of control and power. Ideally, again, reporting from the wars, therefore, has to reach a point of a tense compromise. Or must it? 1. Visibility of Proof: Seeing is Destroying, Seeing is Believing "'If I had to sum up current thinking on precision missiles and saturation weaponry in a single sentence' said W. J. Perry a former US Under-Secretary of state for Defence, 'I would put it like this: once you can see the target, you can expect to destroy it'. This quotation perfectly expresses the new geostrategic situation and partially explains the current round of disarmament. If what is perceived is already lost, it becomes necessary to invest in concealment what used to be invested in simple exploitation of the new stealth weapons."3 It is not matter anymore of incredulous, science-ridden sceptics who need tangible proofs that something happened, like, for example, landing of aliens in some American backwater. The situation is much more complex today, and it is not (only) a question of eyewitnesses who are deliberately lying, because they desperately need attention and/or are psychotic. It is another, more radicalised issue: humans are not seen as trustworthy enough to make "important" decisions. It seems that we do not trust other people or our own eyes, but we do trust our technology, i.e. video cameras when they he Nato-Yugoslav war, the Yugoslav government decided to ban all foreign journalists from Kosovo. The only remaining sources of information from the ground were official Yugoslav State agencies and the members of secessionist guerrillas, KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). Just like the Bosnian Muslim forces in the previous war, KLA spreaded stories of atrocities to Nato, and Nato was only too happy to distribute them to western media, using them as a justification of their actions. Without means to confirm the information, respectable western media quickly launched stories that later turned out to be untrue, to the embarrassment of champions of "unbiased" press and television. There are several examples. It did not matter that Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova was proclaimed dead and then resurrected a couple of days later or that Pristina football stadium, claimed to be a "concentration camp" for 20,000 people, on inspection turned out to be empty. What mattered was that data such as these were daily published by the media, that they served a propaganda role at a certain moment, only to be forgotten in face of new, equally improbable reports. There were also reports of 20 Albanian teachers shot in front of their pupils. After a check-up, it turned out that the village where it allegedly took place had only 200 inhabitants. Therefore, "the number of teachers was high even by the educational standards of the New Left" (Mick Hume). KLA obviously spreaded rumours about the atrocities, and possibly instructed the population to do the same.7 3. Spin Doctors: Seeing Should Not Mean Believing The public is not only a victim of media's deliberate policies that encourages some types of stories over others. The media themselves are also involuntary victims of PR doctoring. They are presented by specific bits of information gathered by professional groups that are paid to disseminate false statements and allegations to meet a certain political or tactical aim. One of the such companies, Ruder & Finn Global Public Affairs, became notorious during the wars in Yugoslavia. Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Albanians from Kosovo hired them to spread propaganda against the Serbs. The interview which has been given to Mr. Jacques Merlino in Paris in October 1993 for French Channel Two television, throws some light on practices employed by PR companies. The interviewee is James Harff, director of Ruder & Finn, and he explains how his company managed to perform a media coup: H: "For 18 months, we have been working for the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as for the opposition in Kosovo. Speed is vital, because items favourable to us must be settled in public opinion. The first statement counts. The retractions have no effect. M: What achievement were you most proud of? H: To have managed to put Jewish opinion on our side. This was a sensitive matter, as the dossier was dangerous looked from this angle. President Tudjman was very careless in his book "Wastelands of Historical Reality". Reading this writings, one could accuse him of anti-Semitism. In Bosnia, the situation was no better: President Izetbegovic strongly supported the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in his book "The Islamic Declaration". The Croatian and Bosnian past was marked by a real and cruel anti-Semitism. Tens of thousands of Jews perished in Croatian camps. So there was every reason for intellectuals and Jewish organisations to be hostile towards the Croats and Bosnians. Our challenge was to reverse this attitude. And we succeeded masterfully. At the beginning of August 1992, the New York Newsday came out with the affair of (Serb) concentration camps. We jumped at the opportunity immediately. We outwitted three big Jewish organisations - B'Nai Brith Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress. We suggested to them to publish an advertisement in the New York Times and to organise demonstrations outside the UN. This was a tremendous coup. When the Jewish organisations entered the Game on the side of the (Muslim) Bosnians, we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind. Nobody understood what was happening in Yugoslavia. But, by a single move, we were able to present a simple story of good guys and bad guys, which would hereafter play itself. We won by targeting Jewish audience. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the press, with the use of words with high emotional content, such as "ethnic cleansing", "concentration camps", etc. which evoked images of Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The emotional charge was so powerful that nobody could go against it.8 From the point of view of media researcher, there are some interesting facts stated here and some important consequences. First is relevance of the first statement, i.e. speed of launching information. In his article "The Next War: Live", Barrie Dunsmore9 analyses how live coverage have affected previous wars, particularly the war in Gulf. For this research, however, it turns out that it is beside the point whether the information is "live" or not, i.e. was it instantaneous or not, as long as it was quick enough to be presented to the public before the enemy got hold of it and interpreted it its own way. "The retractions", as Mr. Harff puts it, "have no effect". This means that one can operate, deliberately or otherwise, with constructions that do not have to be even close to truth, and still reach a certain effect in the audience. However, once news or PR agency distances itself from the source (quoting it from KLA, Nato or Newsday, a Ruder & Finn 's source), there is no legal or professional obligation nor standard that could limit or obstruct such actions. As long you "quote" someone else's rumour, there's nobody who can stop you spreading racism or hatred. Moreover, there is no use in legally exposing such actions after they served their initial propaganda purpose. There is also no use in attempts of persecution for libel of those who manipulated the information, as the trial of ITV report on alleged death camps in Bosnia implies. Not only subjectivity, taking sides and partisanship are allowed into journalism, but also hate speech is absolutely justified on all levels of communication under the nice euphemism "journalism of attachment". Finally, it is indicative that Serbs had no contact similar to Ruder & Finn. They have lost media wars in all 90's civil wars waged in former Yugoslavia. As a direct consequence, they later lost both the diplomatic plights and territories. This proves that the media role in former Yugoslavia's wars have more important role than it might appear. 4. Two Events from Yugoslav Civil War To illustrate the idea of "attachment" in western journalism, one should take into account two important occasions. One which was used as an excuse for Nato intervention in Bosnia, and the other which served the same purpose in war over Kosovo. The same scenario has been repeated in Yugoslav civil wars on several occasions. It complies with the scheme threat-atrocity-use of force. The first instance was after the three secessionist Yugoslav republics, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, encouraged by several European countries, initiated unilateral independence in 1991 and 1992. On the 21 May 1992 US Senate passed The Yugoslavia Sanctions Act of 1992. Yugoslavia was to fulfil six points in order to avoid the imposition of economic and cultural sanctions because it opposed the secessions. Shortly after, on 27 May 1992, in what becomes known as the Breadline Massacre, at least sixteen people are killed and over a hundred are wounded. Bosnian Serbs are blamed for the attack. The EC decides on the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. They would devastate what was left of the economy of southern Yugoslav republics. Another occasion is Nato intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in August 199510. On 27 August, US official pronounces threats to Serbs in case they do not sign a "peace plan" which is conspicuously unfavourable for them, even though they have already agreed to negotiate. The next day (28th) a massacre in Sarajevo's Markale marketplace takes place. With TV cameras conveniently placed on the spot, horrific scenes were filmed as 37 people were killed and 70 wounded. These scenes have been aired throughout the world, which caused the expected public indignation. The following day (29th), UN accused the Serbs of the massacre. Finally, on the 30th of August, Nato, synchronised with Bosnian and Croat forces on the ground, launches air attack against the Serbs in Bosnia. "Peace talks" take place during the Nato attack. UN Security Council addresses the issue only after the military action has already been taken. The last but not the least, Republika Srpska, a Serbian enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is four years after still occupied by Nato forces, which control its media, hunt down alleged war criminals and replace elected presidents at will. The sequence of the principal events is remarkably similar to those in the current Kosovo crisis, but not in such obvious time sequence. First, by means of media coverage and financing of weapons, US back secessionist force inside Yugoslavia against the Serbs (beginning of 1998). Then the apparently "independent" international body (OSCE in this case), led by a US diplomat William Walker discovers an alleged massacre in Kosovo's village of Racak and accuses Serbs for killing 40 civilians in cold blood. TV stations appear on the scene, films discovered bodies and western public is again aroused. Serbs, who have already agreed to 2,000 OSCE monitors, are already eager to sign peace process that would relieve them from the responsibility of establishing law and order into the province - even after the bad experience in Bosnia. However, in October 1998 the US proposes "peace plan" (in this case so-called "Rambouillet Accords") over Kosovo that is a massive violation of Yugoslav sovereignty. It is presented to Serbs in form of an ultimatum: in case it is not signed, the country would be bombed. When the Serbs refused it, Nato bypasses UN, largely infringes international law and goes forward with the bombing, while in the meantime a "diplomatic solution" is sought. One of the US conditions for this diplomatic solution is de facto independence of Kosovo, and its occupation by the Nato forces, as well as free use of Yugoslav territory and air space by the Nato. 5. Atrocities Management There are several serious political implications of the whole affair, but what is important for us in this occasion is a notion of "atrocities management", as Edward S. Herman would put it. Namely, what Herman alone11 and together with Noam Chomsky12 means by this term is that certain occurrences in wars world-wide are played up to the largest possible extent or even falsified in US media, while others are ignored. The purpose is to demonise one side and victimise the other in accordance with American interests, to make a clear demarcation between "worthy" and "unworthy" victims. The operations in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere had similar "atrocities management" pattern. In a shade of "respectable" international organisation (such as UN or OSCE) a US agent operates with clear instructions. In Iraq, it was Richard Butler, who was hired to lead the UN "inspection force". In fact, he worked for US intelligence with a task to provide enough evidence to condone the Iraqis. UN Security Council charged him with fabricating his last report to fit the needs of US and justify bombing of Iraq in December 1998.13 In the two mentioned cases, Markale market and Racak village it turned out later, Serbian "atrocities" were obviously staged to win public opinion against them. In case of Markale market massacre, which triggered US/Nato action against the Serbs, the Sunday Times writes how the British and French ammunition experts from UN examined the scene of the massacre. They concluded that there is no "evidence" that Bosnian Serbs were responsible and expressed their suspicions that Bosnian Muslim forces - like in some previous occasions - killed their own people in order to make a media coup. However, they were ruled out by US official.14 Initial reports from alleged Racak village massacre in Kosovo which was the introduction to an US/Nato ultimatum and subsequent air strikes on Yugoslavia, indicate that it was a similar affair. Racak was a KLA stronghold. Serbian police, accompanied by the French TV crew, and observed by the OSCE, launches an attack to the village. The latter verified that KLA was encircled and in exchange of fire, suffered heavy casualties. Apart from KLA, the village was empty. Yugoslav police takes control of the village, but leaves by nightfall, along with a crew. 12 hours later, William Walker, a head of OSCE, is called by KLA along with journalists. He discovers about 40 bodies of Albanians in civilian clothes shot at a close range at the edge of the village, expresses indignation and accuses the Serbs for the massacre. Several commentators (including the French crew), however, expressed serious doubts about the authenticity of this story, claiming that KLA gathered their military casualties, dressed them in civilian clothes, and, with the help of Walker, launched a media coup.15 6. Conclusion What is frightening in the whole affair is the synchronisation of diplomatic, media and military action in all these cases. This tells us a lot about the connection of governments and corporate media and their joint efforts in manipulating public opinion. Sheer power of propaganda, which is consistently repeated by the US, UK and media from other countries during the Kosovo crisis strongly shows that governments have means to indirectly control the media even though the latter are formally independent. This way thay can convert the public opinion. Pools in UK showed that, even though the Nato intervention in Yugoslavia was grossly failing to meet any of its objectives, support for war was growing. This also indicates vulnerability of the contemporary media and their management to political power and their apparent instrumentalization and misuse in power game. It leaves us with little, if any hope for the ideals of media as "public service" for "objective information". Conclusion is that the media miraculously abandon these ideals during wars in which their countries are involved, and they become real combatants in wars in much more tangible sense than the military is. Western armies do not rely anymore on traditional military skills - tactics, courage, etc. It is heavily dependent on technological advantage; it almost assumes the position of distant, "unreal", video game destruction. Media, on the other hand, make good out of a bad cause and other way round, manage atrocities, demonise and victimise. The sole role of military is to verify what the media has already established: if the Iraqis are shown on TV shattered and fleeing, the only thing left for them is to really do it. Thanks to media, wars such as the one in Persian Gulf, are decided even before they take place. NOTES 1) Herman Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy Of The Mass Media New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 2) Walsh, Jeffrey (ed.) The Gulf War Did Not Happen, Hunts, 1995: Arena, and Baudrillard, Jean La Guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu, Paris, 1991: Galilée. 3) Virilio, Paul, War and the Cinema, 1989, London, p. 4. 4) A statement of general Dragoljub Ojdanic on Thursday, 29 April to Yugoslav News Agency Tanjug 5) "NATO claimed to have shot down many Yugoslav aircraft (according to NATO, they destroyed 50% of Yugoslavia's MiGs, which would amount to at least 35 aircraft), however, they also failed to provide any proof (except for the one or two MiG-29s of questionable origin shot down over Bosnia). And NATO has very capable photo and video reconnaissance aircraft, including the U-2 and a number of highly advanced UAVs, such as Predator and Hunter, not to mention that all NATO aircraft are equipped with video recording devices. Yugoslav media was lucky to photograph the remains of the downed F-117. There were reports in Russian military publications back from the Persian Gulf War against Iraq: Iraq claimed to have shot down a US F-117, but failed to present any proof because the aircraft's remains were hit by a laser-guided bomb before Iraqi troops found the crash site" (quoted from Internet site: http://www2.cybercities.com/v/vernik/aviation/natodown.htm) 6) Quoted from: Hammond, Philip The War on TV, due to be published in the weekly magazine Broadcast on 14 May 7) "I've seen assertions by western journalists that 'thousands of refugees have all told the same story'. Use common sense, Do you really think that the handful of western journalists over there have questioned thousands of people? And how many of these western journalists speak Albanian or Serbo-Croatian? My guess is none. That means that they have to rely on translators who are probably being furnished by the KLA. The refugee can be saying one thing and the translator another, and the reporter will be none wiser. That happened in Vietnam, where translators sometimes turned out to be Viet Cong intelligence agents." Reese, Charley "Serbs are also victims - of a massive propaganda campaign" Orlando Sentinel, 25 April, 1999. 8) "?M: But when you did all of this, you had no proof that what you said was true. You only had the article in Newsday! H: Our work is not to verify information. We are not equipped for that. Our work is to accelerate the circulation of information favourable to us, to aim at judiciously chosen targets. We did not confirm the existence of death camps in Bosnia, we just made it known that Newsday affirmed it. M: Are you aware that you took on a grave responsibility? H: We are professionals. We had a job to do and we did it. We are not paid to be moral." quoted from: Dr. Yohanan Ramati "Stopping the war in Yugoslavia" A Monthly Jewish Review, April 1994, New York: Midstream (also in: "Manipulating the media", Intelligence Digest, Great Britain, February 4, 1994 and Nora Beloff , "The secret weapon? PR" Jewish Chronicle, Great Britain, December 10, 1993). 9) Dunsmore, Barrie, The Next War: Live? Discussion paper D-22, March 1996, Harvard University 10) "27 August 1995 Prior to attending peace talks in Paris, Richard Holbrooke, US negotiator, states that force will be used against the Bosnian Serbs if a settlement is not reached shortly. 28 August 1995 Up to 37 people are killed in a reported mortar attack near Sarajevo's Markale Marketplace; preliminary UN investigations say there is no clear evidence of who is responsible (Cymbeline mortar-locating radar failed to track the fatal shell); the Bosnian government delegation threatens to pull out of the Paris talks unless military action is taken against the Bosnian Serbs; Radovan Karadzic, at about the time of the attack, announces acceptance of the Contact Group plan as a basis for negotiations. 29 August 1995 At 7 a.m. local time, the UN report on the Marketplace shelling is complete; in Paris, the Bosnian government delegation agrees to attend the talks; at 11 a.m. local time the UN announces that Bosnian Serbs are clearly responsible for the attack; the only new evidence cited is that someone heard the shell being fired from a Serb position; later, Russian, British, French, and Canadian investigators cast strong doubt on the certainty of the UN report. 30 August 1995 In the early hours of the morning NATO launches air attacks against Bosnian Serb positions throughout central and eastern Bosnia; around Sarajevo the UN Rapid Reaction Force fires more than 600 shells at Bosnian Serb positions, joined by Bosnian government artillery. 7 September 1995 In Geneva a formal agreement to seek a negotiated settlement is made between the warring parties; NATO attacks continue, as they have throughout the week 9 September 1995 Cruise missiles are launched from U.S. ships in the Adriatic against targets around Banja Luka; Bosnian government, Bosnian Croat, and Croat forces launch offensives in western Bosnia. 19 September 1995 In the 10 days of coincidental NATO air attacks, Bosnian government, Bosnian Croat, and Croatian advances, in western Bosnia, the towns of Jajce, Drvar, ?ipovo and others have fallen. Up to 150,000 Serb civilians have fled to Banja Luka, many forced out of three or four towns successively since the end of July. 26 September 1995 U.S.-sponsored talks open in New York, attended by the foreign ministers of Croatia, Bosnia and the FRY. 1 November 1995 Talks open in Dayton; Presidents Milo?evic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic are present. 21 November 1995 "Dayton Peace Accord" deems Republika Srpska one "entity" within the internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement). 1 December 1995 NATO Council, meeting in Brussels, agrees on deployment of NATO troops in Bosnia. 6 December 1995 Advanced contingent of U.S. NATO troops arrives in Tuzla; British and French troops start to "change hats" from UN to NATO; German parliament votes to send 4,000 troops to support NATO deployment in Bosnia: they will be stationed in Croatia. 15 December 1995 UN Security Council approves NATO deployment in Bosnia. 20 December 1995 Formal handover of UN command to NATO. Bill 11) "It is extremely easy to demonise by atrocities management. I became steeped in this subject during the Vietnam War era, and even published a small volume in 1970 entitled Atrocities in Vietnam: Myths and Realities. The marvel of that era was how easily and effectively the U.S. establishment and media focused on the cruel acts and killings of the indigenous National Liberation Front (NLF, "Vietcong") and made them into sinister killers ("terrorists"), when in fact the terror of the U.S. and its local and foreign proxies was worse by a very large factor. The violence of the Diem government in the late 1950s was extremely brutal, indiscriminate, and massive; and when the US entered the fray directly in the 1960s a new level of (wholesale terror) was reached with chemical warfare, napalm, fragmentation bombs, "free fire zones," and high level B-52 bombing raids on "suspected Vietcong bases" (i.e., villages). The NLF was always more selective in its killing, for strategic and political reasons--it had a mass base in the countryside that it did not want to harm or alienate. The Diem government, its successors, and the US, were less discriminating for the same reason--they had little or no peasant support, so that indiscriminate terror and mass killing was the understandable strategy of aggression. Similarly, with the US "constructively engaged" with South Africa, Israel, and Turkey over the past several decades, the South African occupation of Namibia, assaults on the front line states, and support of Renamo and Savimbi, Israel's invasions and "iron fist" attacks on Lebanon, and Turkey's scorched earth policies and killings of Kurds, could proceed for many years killing hundreds of thousands unimpeded by any intense focus on atrocities or serious attention from the "international community." Turkey could even offer to lend armed support to the NATO effort in Kosovo, presumably diverting troops from killing Kurds, without eliciting the slightest sense of irony in the West. Only when the Godfather needs atrocities--as with the NLF, PLO, or Serbs--do atrocities come on line, with intense focus and indignation. Herman, Edward S. Atrocities Management, quoted from: http://www.zmag.org/atrocities.htm 12) Herman Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy Of The Mass Media New York: Pantheon Books, 1988, pp 37-86 13) Wilson, Gary Warhawk Behind U.S. Kosovo Policy - Amb. Walker Covered Up real Massacres in El Salvador Quoted from: http://iacenter.org/bosnia/balkans.htm 14) "British ammunition experts serving with the United Nations in Sarajevo have challenged key 'evidence' of the Serbian atrocity that triggered the devastating Nato bombing campaign which turned the tide of the Bosnian war. The experts, who examined the scene of the market massacre in Sarajevo in August, say they found no evidence that Bosnian Serbs had fired the lethal mortar round. They suspected the Bosnian government army might have been responsible. They say French analysts who also examined the scene agreed with them. But they were overruled by a senior American officer, and the UN issued a statement saying it was beyond any doubt that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for the blast, in which 37 people were killed and 90 wounded. The carnage was used as the pretext for Nato's huge air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, which was followed by extensive battlefield losses, and forced the Serbs to the negotiating table. They concluded that four of the mortars, which had caused no injuries or loss of life, had been fired from positions on a compass bearing of between 220deg and 240deg, indicating Serbian positions. The fifth shell, which caused the bloodshed, had come from a different position on a bearing of 170deg, which they could not identify. They suspected that the perpetrators might easily have been not the Bosnian Serbs but the Bosnian government army, which has been implicated in other incidents such as a rocket attack on Sarajevo's television station on June 29, in which five people died and 30 others were injured. Their observations and findings were confirmed by the French, and they returned to base to make their report. A senior American officer at the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) headquarters in Sarajevo dismissed their findings. Single mortar rounds can be fired without warning into crowded squares or streets with enough accuracy to ensure casualties. In February last year a mortar fired into the same market complex as the one hit in August killed 68 people. Throughout the siege of Sarajevo, there have been repeated but unproven suspicions among UN officers that the Bosnian army had on occasions mortared its own side for propaganda purposes?" McManners, Hugh, "Serbs Not Guilty of massacre" The Sunday Times, 1 October 1995. 15) Ames, Mark and Taibbi, Matt Meet Mr Massacre Washington Post, May 6, 1996. From what I saw, I do not hesitate to describe the crime as a massacre, a crime against humanity," he said. "Nor do I hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility." We all know how Washington responded to Walker's verdict; it quickly set its military machine in motion, and started sending out menacing invitations to its NATO friends to join the upcoming war party. In late 1989, when Salvadoran soldiers executed six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her 15 year-old daughter, blowing their heads off with shotguns, Walker scarecely batted an eyelid. When asked at a press conference about evidence linking the killings to the Salvadoran High Command, he went out of his way to apologise for chief of staff Rene Emilio Ponce, dismissing the murders as a sort of forgivable corporate glitch, like running out of Xerox toner. "Management control problems can exist in these kinds of these kinds of situations," he said. "I'm not condoning it, but in times like this of great emotion and great anger, things like this happen," he said, apparently having not yet decided to audition for the OSCE job. Walker questioned the ability of any person or organisation to assign blame in hate crime cases. Shrugging off news of eyewitness reports that the Jesuit murders had been committed by men in Salvadoran army uniforms, Walker told Massachusetts congressman Joe Moakley that "anyone can get uniforms. The fact that they were dressed in military uniforms was not proof that they were military." Later, Walker would recommend to Secretary of State James Baker that the United States "not jeopardise" its relationship with El Salvador by investigating "past deaths, however heinous." This is certainly an ironic comment, coming from a man who would later recommend that the United States go to war over...heinous deaths. As Walker knows, not only can "anybody have uniforms", but anyone can have them taken off, too.[..] Wilson, Gary Warhawk Behind U.S. Kosovo Policy - Amb. Walker Covered Up real Massacres in El Salvador (quoted from: http://iacenter.org/bosnia/balkans.htm) A U.S. State Department veteran who directed the dirty war against El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980's and lied about every aspect of it. Walker, now the head of a NATO-imposed inspection team in Kosovo, said he had visited the site of the alleged massacre and declared that he knew all the facts. He was the judge, jury and executioner all in one. Not even a district attorney in any United States city could so boldly make such a declaration. Guilty first. Evidence later. The Yugoslav government ordered Walker's expulsion. The U.S. media all said this was in order to cover up what had really happened. But that's turning reality on its head. It was Walker who spoke out before the facts could be known. He thus guaranteed that Washington's version of what happened became the official version. That 's a real cover-up. Walker heads up a NATO inspection team in Kosovo. Who makes up the team? "Sizeable numbers have military backgrounds; a lesser number, but also a sizeable number, have police backgrounds," Walker said at a State Department news conference Jan. 8 (official transcript, U.S. Information Service). When asked if the Kosovo team was a spy team like the UNSCOM group in Iraq, Walker replied, "I hope everyone on my mission is trying to gather as much intelligence as they possibly can." Questioned again, "Are you reporting it back to Washington?" Walker replied, "A lot of it comes back to Washington, but it goes to all the capitals [of the NATO powers]." Sounds a lot like what's been happening in Iraq. Walker was responsible for setting up a phoney humanitarian operation at an airbase in Ilopango, El Salvador. It was secretly used to run guns, ammunition and supplies to the contra mercenaries attacking Nicaragua. ------Syndicate mailinglist-------------------- Syndicate network for media culture and media art information and archive: http://www.v2.nl/syndicate to unsubscribe, write to in the body of the msg: unsubscribe your@email.adress ________________________________________________________________________________ no copyright 1999 rolux.org - no commercial use without permission. is a moderated mailing list for the advancement of minor criticism. more information: mail to: majordomo@rolux.org, subject line: , message body: info. further questions: mail to: rolux-owner@rolux.org. archive: http://www.rolux.org